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INTRODUCTION
On its face, Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
seems tailor-made for lawsuits against government.1 Rule 23(b)(2)
allows a class action when "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
* Thanks to Professor David Super of the University of Maryland School of Law for
suggesting the topic and for his continuing guidance. Thanks also to Professor Margaret
Berger of Brooklyn Law School and Professor Nina Mendelson of the University of
Michigan Law School for their helpful ideas.
1. See FED. R. CJV. P. 23(b)(2).
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declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole."2 This situation
arises frequently in people's dealings with government agencies:
recipients of public benefits and consumers using public utilities, for
example, constitute large groups of people all subject to identical
government policies who might seek injunctive relief.3
Litigants attempting to invoke Rule 23(b )(2) against government
agencies have encountered an unforeseen obstacle, however, often
referred to as the "necessity doctrine." Many courts have declined to
certify

classes

when

"[n]o useful

purpose

would be

served by

permitting [the] case to proceed as a class action."4 These denials of
class certification are premised on the idea that all putative plaintiffs
would benefit from a favorable finding and the resulting injunctive or
declaratory relief, and thus class certification is unnecessary. For
example, one court denied class certification because

"[t]he court

could reasonably assume the good faith of a defendant such as the
Chief Clerk of a state court especially given his express willingness to
follow the court's injunction."5 Dependen�e on the good faith of the
defendant creates a problem for future potential litigants. If rulings
are limited to the individual litigants in the case, those who are not
parties to the original lawsuit cannot invoke the judgment, but must
instigate new proceedings if the defendant does not adhere to the
ruling. Particularly for people whose resources and access to the legal
system are limited, the costs of beginning new proceedings can be
prohibitive.6 In addition,even litigants with the resources to begin new
proceedings can encounter difficulties enforcing judgments against
government entities.7
The necessity doctrine has great geographical acceptance, and at
first glance appears fairly well-entrenched. Courts in most of the
federal circuits have permitted the use of the necessity doctrine.8

2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (utilities); Almendares v. Palmer, 222 F.R.D. 324
(N.D . Ohio 2004) (food-stamp benefits).
4. Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409
U.S. 815 (1972).
5. Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1357 (1st Cir. 1985).
6. For a discussion of the problems of potential class members who have difficulty
accessing the legal system, see Daan Braveman, Class Certification in State Court Welfare
Litigation: A Request for Procedural Justice, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 57, 73-79 (1979).
7. See infra Part II for more on the difficulties for individual litigants.
8. See, e.g. , Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d
1536, 1548 (10th Cir. 1994); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir.
1978); Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686-87 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd
on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City
of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d
Cir. 1 973); Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot,
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A few circuits have accepted some form of the doctrine, but have
limited it to situations in which the defendant promises to apply the
ruling broadly or the nature of the ruling would make it automatically
apply broadly.9 In other circuits, the status of the doctrine is unclear.10
Only the

Seventh

doctrine, arguing

Circuit has completely rejected
that

such

analysis

has

no

place

the necessity
in

Rule

23

jurisprudence.11 Courts of appeals may be reluctant to overturn the
necessity doctrine because it has been applied for a long time.12 In
addition, the Supreme Court has not shown interest in resolving the
split,13and the Advisory Committee did not address this issue in recent
amendments to Rule 23.14
Still, the widespread acceptance of the necessity doctrine among
appellate courts does not mean that its application is universal. Several
district courts in circuits that accept the necessity doctrine have
utilized their discretion and declined to apply the necessity doctrine.1 5

409 U.S. 815 (1972); Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 78 (D.D.C. 1995); Lucky v. Bd.
of Regents, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 986, 993 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
9. See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985); Boyland v. Wing, No. 92CV-1002, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7496 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2001).
10. See Baca! v. SEPTA, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 707 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Nehmer v.
United States Veterans' Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
11. E.g., Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1978). Early in the history of
the necessity doctrine, two student notes contended that the necessity doctrine did not
constitute an appropriate reading of Rule 23. See Michael J. Murphy & Edwin J. Butterfoss,
Note, The "Need Requirement": A Barrier to Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2), 67 GEO.
L.J. 1211 (1979); Richard S. Talesnick, Note, The Necessity Doctrine: A Problematic
Requirement for Certification of Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1025
(1980). Still, the Seventh Circuit alone rejects the doctrine.
12. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) ("[A] decision to
overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided.").
13. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978). In Craft,
although no writ of certiorari was sought on the issue of class certification, the Supreme
Court did consider, sua sponte, the issue of mootness, which would have been avoided had a
class been certified. Id. The Court noted that "[s]ince the Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's refusal to certify a class, the existence of a continuing 'case or controversy'
depends entirely on the claims of respondents." Id. at 8. The Court did not take this
opportunity to make any comment at all about the propriety of the denial of class
certification. See id. The Court has similarly declined to comment on the necessity doctrine
in other cases. For example, in Northern States Power Co. v. Ihrke, 409 U .S. 815 (1972), the
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot but did not consider whether a class should have
been certified to avoid mootness. Overruling the denial of class certification would have
avoided the mootness problem, but the Supreme Court did not consider the issue. See
Murphy & Butterfoss, supra note 1 1 , at 1230.
14. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Mar. 27, 2003), at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv03p.pdf.
15. See, e.g., D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-03-2489, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5189, at *42-45 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) (discussing limitations on the Second
Circuit's acceptance of the doctrine); Almendares v. Palmer, 222 F.R.D. 324, 334 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (discussing limits on the Sixth Circuit's approach); Baca! v. SEPTA, 4 Am. Disabilities
Cas. (BNA) 707 (E.D. Pa. 1 995) (discussed infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text).
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Indeed, two circumstances suggest that district courts should limit the
application of the necessity doctrine: the inability of plaintiffs to
invoke offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against government
agencies, 16 and the tendency of agencies to decline to apply adverse
circuit court rulings to nonlitigants, a practice
known as
"nonacquiescence."17 Both of these factors make it less certain that
people who are not parties to the initial litigation will be able to
benefit from a ruling unless a class is certified.
This Note argues that district courts should rarely,if ever, refuse to
certify classes based on the necessity doctrine, even in circuits which
have endorsed it. Part I argues that class certification is necessary to
ensure that class-wide relief will be available. Part I I argues that
ensuring the availability of relief with sufficiently broad scope is
particularly critical because of its benefits for putative class members,
noting in particular the relevance of the inability of plaintiffs to use
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government and agency
nonacquiescence.
I.

C

LAS S CERTIFICATION AND THE SCOPE OF THE JUDGMENT

The most critical distinction between class actions and individual
lawsuits is the relief granted by the court. In class actions, judicial
relief affects a

large number

of people, whereas judgments

in

individual actions usually impact only the parties to the litigation.
Courts

invoking

the

necessity

doctrine

have

held

that

class

certification is not necessary in some cases because broad injunctive
relief can be granted without class certification.18 This argument has
two major flaws. First, as shown in Section I.A, defendants seek to
avoid class certification largely to avoid a remedy with broad

16. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). Under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, once a court decides something against a party in one lawsuit, it is given
conclusive effect in subsequent lawsuits. Id. at 158. Nonmutual collateral estoppel, in which
the party that seeks to invoke collateral estoppel was not a party to the original lawsuit, was
approved by the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant
from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another
action against the same or a different party. Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when
a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously
litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159 n.4.

17. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz I);
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case A gainst Jntracircuit
Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831 (1990) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz II).
18. See, e.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973); Martinez v. Richardson, 472
F.2d 1 121 (10th Cir. 1973).
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application. Because defendants may use the necessity doctrine as a
pretext for limiting the reach of the final judgment, district courts
should be wary of denying class certification based on the assumption
that injunctive relief will apply broadly anyway. Second, as argued in
Section l.B, district courts are not well-positioned at the time of the
decision on class certification to predict what sort of relief will be
appropriate.

Thus, although appellate courts have approved the

necessity doctrine in cases in which district courts had already granted
class-wide relief without class certification,district courts cannot know
ahead of time that class certification will be unnecessary.
A.

Impact on the Scope of Relief

Class certification may truly be unnecessary in cases in which the
ruling will be broadly applicable even without certification. In Dajour
B. v. City of New York,19 the district court limited the scope of the
necessity

doctrine

to

circumstances

in

which

the

government

acknowledged that the ruling would be broadly applicable. 20 Because
the government contested the applicability of the ruling to the broad
class,the court did not apply the necessity doctrine.21 This limitation of

the necessity doctrine seems sensible, although it leaves open the
question of the binding force of the government acknowledgment.22
Still, the government's purported willingness to promise to apply the
ruling broadly calls into question why the doctrine is invoked at all. If
class certification would not affect the scope of relief, why should the
government oppose it? This Section suggests that opposition to class
certification really stems from a desire to limit the scope of relief,and
that district courts should therefore not apply the necessity doctrine
unless they can be sure it will not limit the scope of the relief granted.
Assuming it will not affect the scope of the defendant's liability,
class certification actually benefits the defendant.23 If a case is certified
as a class action and the defendant prevails,the defendant prevents all
class members from relitigating; in an individual action, the defendant

19. No. 00 Civ. 2044, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15661 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2001).
20. Dajour B., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15661, at *34-35.
21. Id. at *34.
22. See infra Section II.B for more discussion of the effect of government promises.
23. See Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose
Interest?, 63 B.U. L. REV. 597, 597-98 (1983) (contending that in "social reform" cases
certified under Rule 23(b )(2), the certification of a class benefits the defendant rather than
the plaintiff). Professor Wilton gives "efforts to challenge statutes or governmental
regulations as unconstitutional, as well as school desegregation cases, prison and mental
hospital reform cases, and employment discrimination cases" as examples of "social reform"
cases in which plaintiffs might seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 601 (footnotes
omitted).
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only estops the parties to the litigation.24 Thus, class certification
protects defendants in cases in which class-like relief could be
granted.25 The potential harm to defendants if no class is certified is
not merely hypothetical. For example, in

Lewis v. New Mexico
Department of Health,26 the government sought to prohibit "class

action-like" relief on the ground that no class had been certified.27 The
court allowed class-wide relief notwithstanding the failure to certify a
class, citing, among other cases, the case in which the Tenth

Circuit

accepted the necessity doctrine.28 This type of ruling allows the
plaintiff to obtain class-wide relief,but does not give the defendant an
opportunity to bind the entire class because due process concerns
prevent the defendant from using the ruling against new plaintiffs. 29
The procedural posture of

Lewis merits some attention. The court

invoked the necessity doctrine in a ruling that favored the plaintiff not
at the class certification phase of the proceedings, but rather when
granting

class-wide

relief

through

summary

judgment.30

The

government defendants opposed the ruling, and thus had a strong
incentive to argue that the necessity doctrine was inapposite: only if
class certification was

necessary could the government contend that

failure to certify a class was sufficient grounds for overturning the
relief granted.31

These arguments are exactly reversed from the

arguments typically made at the class certification stage, where the
plaintiff wants to certify a class and the defendant argues that the
necessity doctrine applies and therefore that certifying a class is not
necessary.

24. For a discussion of the merits of class actions for defendants, see generally id. To
guarantee this benefit for defendants, the drafters of Rule 23 required that plaintiffs seek
class certification at the beginning of the case if broad relief was contemplated. FED. R. C1v.
P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee's notes (1966). The Advisory Committee's notes forbid the
practice of "one-way intervention," through which putative plaintiffs would intervene in the
case only after a favorable decision on the merits. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory
committee's notes (1966); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(l) advisory committee's notes (2003)
("The authority to amend an order under Rule 23(c)(l) before final judgment does not
restore the practice of 'one-way intervention' that was rejected by the 1966 revision of Rule
23.").
25. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 603-04.
26. 275 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (D.N.M. 2003).
27. Lewis, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
28. Id. (citing Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 1973)).
29. Wilton, supra note 23, at 622-23. The decision will of course still have an effect on
future litigation as stare decisis. Still, there are ways to obtain a j udgment in the face of
adverse precedent which are not available in the face of res judicata. See id. at 625-26.
30. See Lewis, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47.
31. See id. at 1346 (citing government's argument that class-like relief was inappropriate
because the case had not proceeded as a class action).
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Only one explanation

attributes

consistent and logical mindsets to each party.32 At each stage, the
defendant seeks to limit the scope of any judgment that may be issued,
while the plaintiff seeks to expand its scope. At the class certification
stage, this means the plaintiff wants class certification and the
defendant does not. Once a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is issued

and the case has already proceeded without class certification, the
defendant attempts to limit the scope of the judgment by arguing that
a judgment should not have wide application unless the class was
certified. The plaintiff argues that a judgment with wide application is
permissible without class certification.
This

explanation

suggests

that

the

critical

feature

of

class

certification is its impact on the scope of the relief granted. The other
features of class certification have modest impacts by comparison. The
characteristics

that

make

class

actions

significantly

more

time

consuming -notice and opportunity to opt out -apply only to Rule

23(b)( 3)class actions in

which a group of individual claims is at issue.33

The features that attach to Rule

23(b)(2)class actions

-a description

of the members of the class in any judgment that ensues,34 court
approval of settlements,35and appointment of class counsel36 -are all
necessary requirements for cases that will affect a large number of
people.37 Further, the burden on defendants from these requirements
is minimal.38

32. But see Wilton, supra note 23, at 603 (suggesting that defendants are behaving
irrationally when they oppose class certification). Professor Wilton's explanation, unlike the
argument that defendants consider the scope of relief at each stage, is unappealing because it
implies that defendants are consistently making strategic errors, which is particularly
unlikely for government defendants who are likely to be relatively sophisticated.
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court
must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances . . . . [T]he
court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion. "). Confusion between
these requirements and the more modest requirements of Rule 23(b )(2) may cause some of
the opposition to Rule 23(b )(2) class actions. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 640.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
35. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(e).
36. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(g).
37. Wilton, supra note 23, at 636 ("[A]bsent dissenting interests can effectively be
protected only if class treatment is approved. "); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46
(1940) (expressing concerns about absent interests being protected).
38. Careful description of the class members should not burden defendants at all.
Appointment of class counsel for plaintiffs similarly places no burden on defendants. Court
approval of settlements could limit the defendant's ability to settle the case, but is necessary
to protect absent class members. See supra note 37.
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The Influence of Procedural Posture

B.

As illustrated in the previous Section,decisions about applying the
necessity doctrine should be made with reference to the scope of the
relief that will eventually
appellate decisions

be granted. This fact limits the utility of

on the

necessity

doctrine.

Appellate

courts

reviewing class certifications know what relief the district court
granted,39and take the relief granted into account in deciding whether
class certification was truly necessary.40 In addition, appellate courts
know whether the case proceeded in a manner typical of the class or in
a manner specific to an individual claim.41 At the time of class
certification, district courts are not privy to this information.
Section

B.1

observes

that

appellate

courts

routinely

make

reference to this additional information in making their decisions.
Section

B.2

argues that

because district courts lack information,

particularly information regarding the scope of relief granted, they
cannot apply the necessity doctrine in the same way and thus should
be more inclined to certify classes. Section

B .3 argues

that district

courts in every circuit retain discretion to certify classes, and that
doing so does not contradict appellate approval of the necessity
doctrine.

39. The appellate case law on the necessity doctrine comes not from interlocutory
appeals but rather from appeals after the case has been fully decided on the merits. See, e.g.,
Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985); Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Galvan v.
Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121. 1122
(10th Cir. 1973); Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as
moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). There are several possible explanations for this trend. Before
1998, when Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) was promulgated allowing interlocutory
appeals on the issue of class certification at the discretion of the courts of appeals, denials of
class certification were not appealable as of right to appellate courts. See Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 465 (1978); FED. R. C1v. P. 23(f); 523 U.S. 1221 (1998)
(adding Rule 23(f)). In addition, appellate courts are unlikely to use their discretion to
decide necessity doctrine cases even when interlocutory appeal is available. The claim of a
court invoking the necessity doctrine is that class certification will make no difference,
suggesting that appellate review is less urgent. Further, the procedures that attach when a
class is certified under Rule 23(b )(2) are much less significant than the procedures that
attach when classes are certified under Rule 23(b)(3) and numerous monetary claims are
joined, again suggesting that immediate appellate review is less critical. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B) (imposing additional requirements only on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions).
40. See, e.g., Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1127 (10th Cir. 1973) (discussed
infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text).
41. See, e.g., Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussed infra notes
67-71 and accompanying text).
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Procedural Posture in the Appellate Court

In two circuits that accept the necessity doctrine, the Tenth 42 and
the Second,43 the leading cases made very explicit use of information
available only to the appellate court. Both courts emphasized that
class certification was not necessary to provide the relief that was
eventually granted.44 In
held that

Martinez v. Richardson,45 the Tenth Circuit

"a class action was not demanded here because the same

relief could be afforded without its use and seemingly the

[district]

court had something of this kind in mind " when it allowed for further
enforcement action.46 The appellate court emphasized in its order that
the trial court should make sure of future compliance.47 The trial court
complied, issuing an order which applied to

"all those

Medicare

beneficiaries similarly situated."48 Over a decade later,a new plaintiff,
not a party to the original lawsuit, reactivated the court's order and
obtained an order to show cause.49 Similarly,in Galvan v. Levine,50the
Second Circuit upheld a class-wide injunction that had been issued in
the absence of a certified class, noting that "what is important ... is
that the

judgment run to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs

but of all others similarly situated. "51
The First Circuit's approach to the necessity doctrine in Dionne v.
Bouley52 brings the importance of knowing what relief was granted
into even sharper focus. In Dionne, the First Circuit held that the
necessity

doctrine

should

not

be

"mechanical," and

that

"the

justification for denying class certification rests on the particular
circumstances."53 The

Dionne case involved a challenge to Rhode

Island's procedure for issuing "Writs of Attachment" which froze
bank accounts or seized assets.54 The circuit court affirmed a denial of

42. See Martinez, 472 F.2d at 1 127.
43. See Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973).
44.

See Martinez, 472 F.2d at 1 127; Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261.

45. 472 F.2d 1 121 (10th Cir. 1973).
46. Martinez, 472 F.2d at 1 127.
47. Id. (ordering the trial court to "fashion an appropriate decree or order so as to make
certain that there will be future compliance with the law in order that persons in the dire
straits which these plaintiffs were in are not cut off without a hearing").
48. Martinez v. Bowen, 655 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D.N.M. 1986) (quoting trial court's order
after remand).
49. Id. at 98, 104.
50. 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261.
52. 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985).
53. Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356.
54. Id. at 1347.
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class certification,referring to the fact that the injunction issued by the
district court applied not only to the named plaintiff but to all Writs of
Attachment issued by the defendant.55 Further, the court noted that
"[w]hile apparently some writs may have been issued shortly after this
injunction, the practice has now ceased and we understood at
appellate argument that the d
[ efendant] is issuing no more writs in any
post-judgment attachment cases. Under the circumstances, we see no
practical need for class certification. "56
These cases all resulted in injunctions covering entire classes
despite the lack of certification of a class action.57 Thus, in these
particular cases class certification truly was not necessary: the same
relief could be and was granted without class certification. But each
appellate court based its conclusion that class certification was not
necessary on the relief actually granted, something that did not come
to light until after the district court issued its injunction, well after the
district court made its decision on class certification. Still,the court in

Dionne suggested explicitly, and the other courts implicitly, that in
future cases district courts should take into account the ability to
provide class relief without certifying a class.58

2.

The Difficult Situation of District Courts

The lesson for district courts from the appellate cases is far from
clear. The cases hold that denying class certification is permissible if
class-wide relief is granted despite the court's refusal to certify a class,
but do not suggest how the district court should go about determining
what relief is likely to be granted while still making a determination on
class certification in the appropriate time frame. Because appellate
courts have not been required to rule on the propriety of the
application of the necessity doctrine at the time of class certification,59
district courts operate with little guidance from appellate courts at that

55. Id. at 1356.
56. Id. at 1356-57.
57. In Martinez, persons who were not parties to the original case made use of the
judgment. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. In Galvan, the parties were directed
to settle an order and judgment, and the appellate court held that the judgment bound the
government with respect to all claimants. Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1259, 1261 (2d
Cir. 1973). In Dionne, the plaintiff sought a "permanent injunction" and the lower court's
order "enjoined (the defendant] from issuing writs of attachment pursuant to the existing
forms and procedures insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion." Dionne v. Bouley,
583 F. Supp. 307, 309, 319 (D.R.I. 1 984).
58. See Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356. The other cases did not give explicit instructions to
future district courts, but their role as precedent in their respective circuits suggests that
district courts should look to them for guidance when making decisions about class
certification that implicate the necessity doctrine.
59. See supra note 39.
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stage of the proceedings. District courts know very little about the
facts of cases when they are deciding whether to certify a class because
they must determine whether to maintain class actions without first
investigating the merits of plaintiffs' claims.60
Although

recent

changes

to

Rule

23

have

removed

the

requirement that courts make rulings on class certification "as soon as
practicable," the

Advisory

Committee advocating the rule change

noted that "an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not
properly part of the certification decision,"61 and that discovery prior
to the decision on class certification should be

"limited to those

aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed
basis. "62 Thus, while the

Advisory

Committee did anticipate more

leeway for district courts to delay a decision on class certification, the
Committee did not suggest that the probable outcome on the merits
should be determined before the decision on class certification.63
The amended Rule

23 recognizes

the potential for changes after

the class certification decision by permitting alteration of the class
certification order before final judgment.64 But conducting a post-hoc
inquiry into exactly whom the named plaintiff does and does not
represent does not comport with the logic of Rule 23, which provides
mechanisms for the interests of absent class members to be considered
as the case proceeds.65 Further,while Rule 23 contemplates changes to
the class as the case progresses,66 it does not contemplate a post-hoc
reversal of an initial refusal to certifya class.
In some cases, it may initially appear that all putative class
members

would

benefit

from

a

judgment

even

without

class

certification, but subsequent developments may make class-wide relief
inappropriate in the absence of class certification. In

Hurley v. Ward,67

the Second Circuit held that class-wide relief was inappropriate absent

60. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). The impact of recent
amendments to Rule 23 is discussed infra.
61. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(l) advisory committee's note (2003).
62. Id.
63. See id. Although, arguably, applying the necessity doctrine means that determining
the scope of relief that may be granted is necessary to determine whether the case can
proceed as a class action, an in-depth look into the merits does not comply with the
suggestions of the advisory note or the text of the rule itself. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(l)(A)
(requiring a decision on class certification at "an early practicable time").
64. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(l)(C); see also id. advisory committee's note (2003) ("A
determination of liability after certification . . . may show a need to amend the class
definition.").
65. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (governing court approval of settlement
actions to ensure that all the interests of class members are represented).

in

class

66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l)(C) ("An order under Rule 23(c)(l) [certifying a class]
may be altered or amended before final judgment.").
67. 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978).
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class certification because there was not agreement on the typicality of
the claim.68 The court distinguished

Galvan by arguing that "[i]n
Galvan and in other similar decisions,the constitutionality of a statute

or administrative practice was in issue and the State conceded that the
same legal question was posed by the application of the challenged
statute or practice to all those within the purported class. "69 The court
noted that "[t]he record in this case, as we have pointed out, focused
upon [the individual plaintiff] and not the general prison
population."70 But this record resulted from the failure to certify a
class; had the class been certified, the course of the litigation would
have changed and the record created would likely have

better

supported class-wide relief.
In

Hurley, the appellate court conducted its inquiry into whether

class-wide relief was appropriate after hearings had been conducted
with the case proceeding as an individual action, and therefore the
case had focused on the individual circumstances of the named
plaintiff.71 The resulting ina bility to grant class-wide relief illustrates
the dangers of proceeding as though class relief will

be availa ble

without formally certifying a class. In addition, because the appellate
decision came after the case had proceeded as an individual action, it
does not give binding guidance to a district court making a decision on
class certification at the outset of the litigation.
Instead, district courts should conduct an inquiry into typicality of
the claim at the beginning of the case.72 A court's decision whether to
certify a class must be made "at an early practica ble time," as it may
shape the rest of the litigation.73 Indeed, Rule
certifying a class

23requires that an order

"define the class and the class claims, issues, or

defenses."74 Denying class certification based on the necessity doctrine
postpones or precludes this narrowing of the issues of the case, and
can alter the scope of the litigation by eliminating some elements
relevant to the class as a whole but not to the individual plaintiff.75
In summary, district courts are left in a difficult position. They
cannot, as the appellate courts do, refer to the relief granted in
determining whether to apply the necessity doctrine because they do
not yet know what relief will

be granted. Thus, district courts are

unlikely to be in a position to state definitively that class certification

68. Hurley, 584 F.2d at 611-12.
69. Id. at 611 (footnote omitted).
70. Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
71. See id.
72. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring typicality for class certification).
73. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(l)(A).
74. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(l)(B).
75. See, e.g., Hurley, 584 F.2d at 610.
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is unnecessary, and should be especially cautious in invoking the
necessity doctrine. The next

Section argues that a district court's

refusal to invoke the necessity doctrine does not contravene appellate
precedent in favor of the doctrine.

3.

District Courts Retain Discretion to Find Necessity and Certify
Classes

Even if courts of appeals do not eliminate the necessity doctrine,
district courts in all circuits retain the discretion to decline to invoke it.
Courts

of

appeals

that accept the

mandated that district courts

refuse

necessity
to

doctrine

have not

certify classes.

Instead,

acceptance of the necessity doctrine consists of approving district
courts' refusal to certify classes when, in the opinion of the district
court, certification would not have served a useful purpose. Thus,
district courts in all circuits remain free to certify classes should they
deem class certification necessary in an individual case.
The necessity doctrine cannot legitimately be characterized as a
mandate in any circuit. As the district court noted in

Baca/ v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,16 "courts of

appeals appear to have only applied this approach when affirming the
denial of a class certification, as opposed to when overruling a district
court's

decision

to

certify

a

class."77

Indeed, the

Baca/ court

questioned the degree to which its own circuit endorsed the necessity
doctrine.78 The court noted that decisions subsequent to the

Third

Circuit's apparent approval of the necessity doctrine had cast doubt on
the viability of the doctrine.79 In addition, the court noted the
ambivalence expressed by the Third Circuit when it initially approved
the doctrine in

Carter v. Butz.80 Though the

Carter opinion is
Cartercourt

commonly cited as supporting the necessity doctrine,81the

gave only a measured approval of the necessity doctrine, stating:
"[t]he [district] court also concluded that the precedential value of its
decision would render a judgment in favor of the class unnecessary.

76. 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 707 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
77. Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712. Additional research by the author,
reviewing cases both befo re and after Baca/, did not disclose any cases which would
constitute exceptions to this principle.
78. Id. at 712-13.
79. Id. at 713 (citing Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 252 (3d
Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey,
43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994)).
80. See Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712-13 (citing Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d
1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1973)).
81. See, e.g. , Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (citing Carter, 479 F.2d at 1089).

1031

There Is Always a Need

March 2005]

While we might well have decided otherwise we conclude that the class
action determination was within the range of discretion permitted by
Rule 23."82 As one commentator observed, "like Newton's Law of
Thermodynamics, for every class denial on the basis of lac� of need,
one is able to find a decision, or several decisions, often in the same
circuit, where other courts have certified Rule 23(b )(2) classes under
virtually the same circumstances. "83
This less-than-ringing endorsement of the necessity doctrine is not
limited to the Third Circuit. As the

Baca/court pointed out, several

other circuits have explicitly emphasized the discretion of the district
court in approving some form of the necessity doctrine.84 For example,
the First Circuit looks to the "discretion that the district court enjoys
under the rule to deny class certification should it reasonably
determine that class relief is not a
' ppropriate.' "85 Similarly,the Ninth
Circuit noted in a necessity doctrine case that "[t]he determination of
class action status rests within the sound discretion of the district
court. "86 And, as noted above, even circuits that have not stressed the
discretion of district courts have not gone so far as to overturna class
certification on the basis of the necessity doctrine.87
Thus, even in circuits in which appellate courts have strongly
endorsed the necessity doctrine, district courts continue to have
discretion to certify classes with little risk that certification will be
overturned.
constrain

As a consequence, the necessity doctrine does not

district

courts, which

remain

free

to

examine

the

circumstances and determine that certification would serve a useful
purpose in an individual case. To be sure, in circuits that have
accepted the necessity doctrine, the district court must consider
whether class certification is truly necessary. Still, no appellate court
has overturned class certification on the ground that it was
unnecessary.88 As a result, a district court that certifies a class because

82. Carter, 479 F.2d at 1089 (emphasis added). The Baca/ court did not note this passage
explicitly, but did suggest that Carter did not stand strongly for the necessity doctrine by
stating that Carter "apparently approv[ed] the decision by a district court denying class
certification on the basis that the precedential value of its decision would render a j udgment
in favor of the class unnecessary." Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712-13 (emphasis
added).
83. Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712 (alteration in original) (quoting 1
HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.19, at 4-62 (3d
ed. 1992)).
84. Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712 (citing Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344,
1356 (1st Cir. 1985); James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
451 U.S. 355 (1981); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1 121, 1127 (10th Cir. 1973)).

85. Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356.
86. James, 613 F.2d at 186.
87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88.

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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it perceives a necessity to do so does not disobey circuit court
instruction to the contrary. Instead, such a district court exercises its
discretion within the bounds articulated by the circuit court.
In summary, the impact of the necessity doctrine comes down to
whether the certification of a class affects the likelihood that the ruling
will

have

broad

application.

If

a

ruling

issued

without

class

certification would be the same as the ruling that would issue with
class certification and will be widely followed or easily enforced,class
certification may truly be unnecessary.

But if the defendant is

prepared to fight to avoid certification, a more reasonable conclusion
is that the defendant anticipates that class certification would have an
impact on the content or scope of the ruling,or on the ease with which
future litigants will be able to invoke the ruling to obtain equivalent
relief. In such cases,class certification does make a difference and thus
the necessity doctrine should not be invoked, particularly because
district courts are not well-positioned to determine whether class relief
will be available without certification. The future impact of failure to
provide class-wide relief is the focus of Part I I.
I I.

T

HE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO PROVIDE CLASS-WIDE
RELIEF

Although the advantages are not quite as self-evident as when a
group of plaintiffs all seek money damages from the same defendant,
class certification is critical in cases where plaintiffs seek injunctive
relief.89 First,plaintiffs have an opportunity to pool resources to obtain
the best possible counsel.9? Second,the court can protect the interests
of a whole group through court approval of settlements.91 Third,
certifying classes enables anyone within the class to enforce the
judgment.92 Finally,class actions help to avoid mooting of claims.93
As discussed above, the third advantage listed - ability of
unidentified class members to enforce court orders - is likely to be
the most contentious issue for defendants.94 This Part shows why this

89. In Nehmer v. United States Veterans' Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113, 119 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
the court succinctly laid out these advantages, so the following summary follows that case
closely. The advantages have also been well-rehearsed elsewhere, and thus are not limited to
that case. See, e.g., Murphy & Butterfoss, supra note 11, at 1228-32 (discussing prejudgment
problems with failure to certify classes); Talesnick, supra note 1 1, at 1040-44 (criticizing
necessity doctrine on policy grounds).
90. Nehmer, 118 F.R.D. at 1 19.
91. Id.; see also supra note 37.
92. Nehmer, 118 F. R.D. at 1 19.
93. Id.; see also Murphy & Butterfoss, supra note 1 1, at 1229-30 (discussing mootness
problems and giving examples).
94. See supra Section I.A.
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feature of class certification is also critical for putative class members.
In particular,it argues that difficulties that future litigants will have in
applying judgments suggest that the necessity doctrine should virtually
never be invoked.
The other factors listed above can preclude the use of the necessity
doctrine in some instances,95 but may not be relevant in other cases
and in any event have not been deemed sufficient to require a blanket
rejection of the necessity doctrine.% These benefits have been fairly
well-rehearsed over the history of Rule 23and the necessity doctrine.97
Thus, this Part focuses on a factor that has not been expressly
considered by courts but will influence all necessity doctrine cases: the
ability of future litigants to enforce the judgment.
Section

I I. A discusses the possibility that the government will

decline to apply the ruling to nonparties,and the difficulties that such
potential litigants will have in ensuring that the ruling is followed.
Section I I.B notes the inadequacies of one possible alternative to class
certification: a promise by the government to apply the ruling to all
similarly situated people.
A.

Unavailability of Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel and the
Possibility of Nonacquiescence

In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v.
Mendoza,98 holding that nonmutual collateral estoppel could not be
used against the federal govemment.99 Government agencies have
taken advantage of this holding by reserving the right to decline to
apply adverse judgments to parties who have not litigated through a
process known as "agency nonacquiescence."100 Simply stated, agency
nonacquiescence is "[t]he selective refusal of administrative agencies

95. See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985) (limiting the
applicability of the necessity doctrine in cases in which mootness may become an issue).
96. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the continuing acceptance of the
necessity doctrine in several circuits); see also Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356 (continuing to apply
the necessity doctrine in cases in which these factors are not deemed problematic).
97. See, e.g., Murphy & B utterfoss, supra note 1 1, at 1228-32 (discussing prejudgment
problems with failure to certify classes).
98. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
99. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162 ("We hold, therefore, that nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel simply does not apply against the Government in such a way as to preclude
relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case."). Although Mendoza's holding has
been narrowed by some rulings in lower courts, it has not been overruled by the Supreme
Court and continues to be applied. Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion A gainst States, 109
HARV. L. REV. 792, 793 (1996). Lower courts have split on whether Mendoza's rationale
applies to state governments as well. See id. at 803-04 (reviewing cases).
100. For a thorough discussion of agency nonacquiescence, see Estreicher
supra note 17, and Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 17.
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to conduct their internal proceedings consistently with adverse rulings
"
of the courts of appeals. 1 01 Agencies have availed themselves of this
option since the 1920s.102 There continues to be controversy about the
appropriateness of agency nonacquiescence, at least when an agency
disregards the judicial opinions of a court of appeals in cases within
the same circuit.1 03 Although courts have roundly criticized the
practice at least where it involves disregarding rulings of the circuit
court in which a new plaintiff appears,104 it continues to have
some acceptance when agencies seek to create a uniform rule of
law around the nation by challenging, through nonacquiescence, a
circuit's rulings.105
Although a full discussion of the appropriateness of agency
nonacquiescence is beyond the scope of this Note, for the purposes of
a district court determining whether to certify a class, it suffices to
know that an agency, rightly or wrongly, might not apply a non-class

101. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 681.
102. Id. Note that although Mendoza did not come down until 1984, the status of
nonmutual collateral estoppel was sufficiently uncertain before then that it had not routinely
been used against the government. See Note, supra note 99, at 792.
103. Compare, e.g. , Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence
and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J.
801 (1990) (criticizing "intracircuit" nonacquiescence), with Estreicher & Revesz I, supra
note 17, and Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 17 (defending intracircuit nonacquiescence
in some cases).
104. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Stieberger,
the court held that intracircuit nonacquiescence was not permitted in the case before it. Id.
at 1356-57. The court noted that "[a]lthough not specifically dealt with by the Supreme
Court, the SSA's non-acquiescence policy has been the subject of almost universal
condemnation by those courts which have considered its legality." Id. at 1353. Other courts
have been similarly critical. See, e.g. , Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497, 1503 (9th Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (holding that "[f]ar from raising
questions of judicial interference in executive actions, this case presents the reverse
constitutional problem: the executive branch defying the courts and undermining what are
perhaps the fundamental precepts of our constitutional system - the separation of powers
and respect for the law," and "(t]hat the Secretary, as a member of the executive, is required
to apply federal law as interpreted by the federal courts cannot seriously be doubted"); see
also Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 699 (describing Lopez and Stieberger as
"representative of the judicial rebuke that intracircuit nonacquiescence by SSA has
engendered").
105. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 753 ("We have shown that intracircuit
nonacquiescence is j ustifiable only when it is employed as an interim measure that allows the
agency to maintain a uniform administration of its governing statute while it makes
reasonable attempts to persuade the courts to validate its preferred policy."). Even the
Stieberger court accepted this:
Intra-circuit non-acquiescence in a circuit court decision also might be less troublesome if
utilized where the agency has substantial reason to believe that subsequent consideration of
the disputed issue in other forums has created conditions which are likely to lead either to
reconsideration by the circuit court in question or to Supreme Court review.
Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1366.

103 5

There Is Always a Need

March 2005]
judgment

to

other

similarly

situated

people.106

Although

nonacquiescence may not be a desirable agency policy,courts' refusal
or inability to eliminate it suggests that it is a legitimate concern for
other putative class members. The ability of agencies to decline to
apply a judgment is particularly problematic for poor plaintiffs who
may

have

difficulty

accessing

the

judicial

system.107

And

nonacquiescence, combined with the inability to apply nonmutual
collateral estoppel, suggests that other putative plaintiffs may not
benefit from the judgment unless a class is certified.
Proponents of nonacquiescence have argued that circuit-wide class
certification cuts off the benefits of nonacquiescence because it
prevents

government

challenges

to

a

judicial

decision

through

nonacquiescence.108 But this justification only applies in a very limited
set of circumstances,when the gove rnment is actively trying to change
the law in a given area.109 When the government simply attempts to
limit the consequences of an adverse ruling,the rationale for allowing
does not apply.110 In addition, denying class

nonacquiescence

certification on these grounds goes far beyond the necessity doctrine;
rather than arguing that certification is not necessary because the
same result would be achieved either way, courts following this
reasoning would be accepting that certification is imprudent because it
would lead to a

differentresult.

Further, certifying a class does not lock the court into a wide 
sweeping judgment. Because the relief sought is equitable, the court
retains discretion to shape the order to guard against overbreadth, or
to allow reexamination of the ruling if the circumstances change.111 For
examp e
l , Rule 60(b ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the court to "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... any ... reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment."112 In addition, as the

106. For examples of agency nonacquiescence, see Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17,
at 699-702, 706-10. For example, the Social Security Administration terminated disability
benefits in some cases despite cases from the court of appeals that would have required
more evidence of improvement in physical condition before benefits were terminated. Id. at
699-700.
107. See supra note 6.
108. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 753 ("While a court that had
previously ruled against the agency could continue to set aside agency action inconsistent
with the previous rule, it could not enjoin the agency from engaging in intracircuit
nonacquiescence in accordance with this standard (or accomplish the same end by certifying
a circuit-wide class action including future litigants).").
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
1 10. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
1 1 1. See, e.g. , FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(l)(C) (allowing amendment of the definition of the
class); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (allowing amendment of final judgment or order).
1 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
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commentary accompanying the most recent revision of

Rule 23

indicates, certifying a class does not require granting a s weeping
judgment : " A determination of liability after certification, ho wever,
may sho wa need to amend the class definition. Decertification may be
warranted after further proceedings."113 Thus, courts that certify
classes keep the full range of options open.
B.
Some

The Value of Promises to Apply the Ruling Broadly
courts,

perhaps

recog mz mg

the

possibility

of

nonacquiescence, have approved application of the necessity doctrine
on the basis of a promise by the agency to apply the ruling to the
entire class.114 Acceptance of these promises as a substitute for class
certification can lead to difficulties in future cases. Plaintiffs cannot be
assured that these promises have any binding effect, and they
therefore constitute a poor substitute for a ruling that applies to the
entire class. Section B. 1 contends that courts are unlikely to enforce
such government promises. Section B.2 discusses the shortcomings of
a regime in which such promises are given binding effect, and argues
that instead district courts should abandon the necessity doctrine.

1.

Unlikelihood of Binding Effect

Government promises to apply a judgment to similarly situated
plaintiffs cannot be assured of having binding legal effect. The issue of
what circumstances would allo w promises by the government in one
case to be binding in future litigation remains open to question. 115
Thus, absent assurances that the government s' promise

113.

FED.

will have

R. crv. P. 23(c)(l) advisory committee's note (2003).

114. See, e.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The State has made
clear that it understands the judgment to bind it with respect to all claimants; indeed even
before entry of the judgment, it withdrew the challenged policy even more fully than the
court ultimately directed and stated it did not intend to reinstate the policy."). Later cases
reveal that this promise was not merely an additional factor, but a requirement. Boyland v.
Wing, No. 92-CV-1002, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7496, at *35 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 2001)
(quoting with approval plaintiffs' observation that '"over the last 25 years . . . federal courts
in New York have routinely departed from Galvan when "State and City defendants have
not given the type of assurance that was given in Galvan""' (alteration in original) (quoting
Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No. 95-CV-0641 , 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22373 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26,
1996)); see also D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-03-2489, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5189, at *42-45 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) (listing government acquiescence in
applying relief across the board among factors in deciding whether to invoke the necessity
doctrine).
115. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) ("[T]he circumstances
under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to
any general formulation of principle." (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1 166
(4th Cir. 1982)) ) ; see also infra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that judicial estoppel
is even less likely against government litigants).
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binding effect, these promises constitute a poor substitute for a court
order encompassing the entire class.
Although the doctrine of judicial estoppel would make a promise
binding if a nongove rnmental litigant were involved, the doctrine is
not necessarily available against the government.116 In
v.

New Hampshire
Maine, the Supreme Court accepted that "[t]he doctrine of judicial

estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding
that is inconsistent

with a claim taken by that party in a previous

proceeding."117 Still, the

Court ackno wledged that judicial estoppel

would not ordinarily apply to govern ment litigants, although the case
before it constituted an exception. 118
One

major

articulated in

concern

with

United States

v.

estoppel

against

the

government,

Mendoza,119 was that the government

should have the freedom to alter its policies and to relitigate
previously decided legal issues.120 In

New Hampshire

v.

Maine,121 the

Court echoed these concerns in discussing judicial estoppel, noting
that

" [o]f course, broad
'
interests of public policy may make it

important

to

allo w a

change

of

positions

that

inappropriate as a matter of merely private interests.

might seem
"'122
The same

argument has been offered in favor of allo wing nonacquiescence: that
the government should have the opportunity to attempt to overrule
previous judicial decisions. 123 In light of these concerns, a court is
unlikely to hold the government to a promise to be bound by a
previous ruling.
A related concern in the

Supreme Court's treatment of estoppel

against the government involves the ability of a single government

116. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 749, 755.
1 17. Id. at 749 (quoting 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
134.30 (3d ed. 2000)). But see Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d
264, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that judicial estoppel should be limited to factual
assertions). In any event, as discussed infra, putative class members cannot rely on judicial
estoppel.
118. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 755. New Hampshire v. Maine itself involved
a dispute over the border between New Hampshire and Maine. Id. at 745. The Court held
that New Hampshire v. Maine constituted an exception to the general rule against judicial
estoppel of government litigants because the case did not arise out of a change in public
policy, which the governmental exception is designed to allow, and applying estoppel would
not prevent the states from enforcing their laws. Id. at 755.
119. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
120. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
121. 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
122. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 755 (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4477 (1981)). The Court went on to note that
the normal prohibition on estoppel against governments did not apply in the case before it
because it was not an example of a single government agent binding the whole government,
or of a change in government policy. Id.
123. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 738-39.
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agent

to bind the entire government. In
Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond,124the Court noted the problems that could

arise from allowing estoppel based on the assertion of one of the
multitude of government employees.125 Although it may appear that a
promise by a government attorney in open court would be more likely
to be binding, the Supreme Court has emphasized the difference
between agency actions and statements by agency counsel in the
course of litigation in terms of the deference they are due.126
Finally,the acceptance of government promises to abide by rulings
in necessity doctrine cases did not presume that these promises had
binding

effect, but

instead

were

premised

on

the

notion that

trustworthy government actors would not make such a promise unless
they intended to abide by it.127 In

Dionne v. Bouley, for example, the

court applied the necessity doctrine because

" t[ ]he court could

reasonably assume the good faith of a defendant such as the

Chief

Clerk of a state court especially given his express willingness to follow
the court's injunction." 128 In Dionne, the court explicitly ruled that
classes should be certi fied "where the good faith of the loser cannot be
fairly presumed."129
The

court in

Dionne did not offer an explanation for the

interjection of a court's determination of the likelihood that the
defendant will proceed in good faith.130 The reliance on the perceived
good faith of the government is particularly problematic given that the
government is less likely to be held to that requirement of good faith
in subsequent proceedings . One can imagine a court's declining to
certify a class when the defendant would have incentive to abide by
the ruling because of the fear of being subject to nonmutual collateral
estoppel in a subsequent case.131 But, as discussed above, the
gove rnment would not be subject to nonmutual collateral estoppel.132

124. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
125. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 433.
126. See, e.g. , Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) (declining
to give deference to an interpretation by agency counsel, deeming it merely the "agency's
convenient litigating position").
127. See, e.g. , Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1357 (1st Cir. 1985); Hurley v. Ward, 584
F.2d 609, 61 1-12 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Since it is ordinarily assumed that state officials will abide
by the court's judgment, where the State has admitted the identity of issues as to all potential
class litigants class certification is indeed unnecessary.").
128. Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1357.
1 29. Id. at 1356.
1 30. See id.
131. Such a fear would, of course, be justified for a nongovernmental litigant. See
Parklane H osiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing offensive nonmutual collateral
estoppel).
132. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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Further, the government has demonstrated a w lil ingness to decl n
i e to
ab ide by court rul n
i gs through nonacqu e
i scence.133 Thus, all else be n
ig
equal,even fi a government ent ti y makes a prom s
i e,one would expect
a court to be more skept c
i al that the government w lil follow the rul n
ig
in the future w ti h no add ti o
i nal jud ic ial superv s
i ion.
i ve that
In summary, pla int fi fs do not have good reason to bel e
i es by government ent ti ies to apply rul n
i gs broadly w lil be
prom s
bind n
i g. Even fi the prom s
ie s
i indeed made in good fa ti h, a pla int fi f
i y of accept n
i g the rul ing w lil not be
has no guarantee that the pol c
i ally contemplated and
changed in the future, a poss ib li ity spec fi c
accepted by the courts.134

Problems with Holding the Government to Its Promises

2.

As d s
i cussed

n
i the prev o
i us

Sect o
i n, the l k
i el h
i ood of future

courts hold ing the gove rnment to
broadly

s
i low. Th is

tis prom s
i e to apply the rul ing

Sect o
i n contends that hold n
i g governments to

these prom si es would const ti ute an n
i fer o
i r alternat v
i e to cert fi c
i at o
in
under

Rule

23.

Such a pol c
i y would str p
i both part e
i s of the

protect o
i ns inherent in class act o
i n l ti g
i at o
i n.
Even if the government s
i prepared to apply the rul n
i g broadly,the
informal nature of the prom s
i e removes several important procedural
safeguards. If a court

n
i tends to apply the rul ing broadly, other

putat v
i e class members should rece v
i e adequate representat o
i n 135 and
court approval of settlements to assure that any settlement serves the
n
i terests

of

all class members.136 Rule

23

mandates

that these

procedures be followed n
i class act ions ;adjud icat n
i g a case affect n
ig a
broad class of persons w ithout ti s protect o
i n const ti utes an end run
around these procedures.137
In add ti o
i n, rely n
i g on a prom si e from a government ent ti y allows
that government ent ti y to determ n
i e the scope of the rul ing. In
contrast, Rule

23reserves for

the court the r g
i ht to determ n
i e the s z
ie

and def n
i ti o
i n of the class and the s
i sues n
i cluded n
i the class act o
i n.138
Th si d s
it n
i ct o
i n could have a s g
i n if icant effect on the impact of the
ruling if the group defined by the governmental prom s
i e d fi fers from
the class that the court would cert fi y.

133. See supra section II.A.
134. See supra notes 1 19-123 and accompanying text.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(l)(A).
137. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
138. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(l)(B) ("An order certifying a class action must define the
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule
23(g).").
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Finally, even if government promises were to have any value to
future putative plaintiffs, governments would probably very rapidly
cease making them. If the government makes a binding promise to
apply a court's ruling broadly, it in essence increases the scope of the
ruling. At the conclusion of the case, rather than making a judgment
applicable only to the litigants in the case, the court,if it finds for the
plaintiff, will in effect be making a judgment for all potential litigants.
The government will almost certainly respond to such a regime by
ceasing to make such promises. As discussed earlier, defendants
opposing class actions are primarily interested in limiting the scope of
relief.139 If the method of opposing the class action automatically
extends the scope of relief, it will no longer appeal to defendants,
particularly because the relief will be asymmetrical -if the defendant
prevails, it cannot use the judgment against other potential plaintiffs
who did not litigate the original case. 140
In summary,extracting a promise from a government atto rney that
the government will apply the ruling more broadly does not solve any
of the problems with the necessity doctrine. If,as is likely,the promise
were not binding, future litigants would have nothing to rely on if the
government changed its view and refused to abide by the ruling in a
future case. If the promise were binding in future litigation, the
government would be in the same position after the case ended as it
would have been if the class had been certified, but without the
safeguards built into Rule 23 that protect absent class members.
C ONCLUSION
The necessity doctrine, although ostensibly about conserving
judicial resources, is really used by defendants as a tool to limit the
scope of the judgment. Application of the necessity doctrine has the
potential to prevent putative class members from benefiting from a
favorable judgment. Consequently, failure to certify a class can have a
significant adverse impact on future litigants, particularly those who
lack the resources to instigate a new actio n. Especially in the current
environment, in which government agencies continue to engage in
nonacquiescence

and

offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel

is

unavailable against them, protecting these litigants should be a
primary concern of the courts.
Even if appellate courts do not reverse their necessity doctrine
jurisprudence,district courts retain the discretion to decline to invoke
the necessity doctrine and to certify classes to protect future litigants.

139. See supra Section I.A.
140. Indeed, this approaches the scenario that Professor Wilton contemplated in arguing
that class certification only helps defendants. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 603.
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District courts shoul d utilize that
ju dgments are respecte d.
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discretion an d ensure that their
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